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Abstract 
It is a well-known fact that reforms necessary to enhance competition and make 
the economy more attractive play a major role in the Government activity in 
Europe. Considering the Italian state of affairs, this paper focuses on the 
inefficiency of public producers in the light of certain market and legal impediments. 
This paper describes key barriers that undermine the healthy functioning of an 
important industrial and service sector of the Italian economy: specifically local 
public transport. This paper also sheds some light on this problem analysing the 
impact that a controversial regulation framework may have on an industry and 
suggests that the degree of liberalisation affects the return on investments. 
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1. Introduction 
The economic literature on public economics has often analysed relationships 
between the government, society and the market, recurrently to evaluate the role of 
public organisations and the impact of public policies on the functioning of modern 
markets. Indeed, over the past decades, there has been heightened interest in the 
organisation and efficiency of public organisations with vast consensus of essential 
key roles of modern governments that comprehend the protection of individuals’ 
freedom, the redistribution of resources and the mitigation of market failures (Pollitt, 
2004), accordingly, many scholars agree on the good reason for the existence of 
government organisations with productive functions. A relatively young area of 
research is the analysis of European integration on local governments alongside 
their sublevels. In this regard, it is generally acknowledged that public budgets in 
many European countries are under significant constraints.  Schmidt (2006) argues 
that the institutional structure has contributed to alter the balance of power among 
national institutions and weakened national decision autonomy.  
The efficiency of the state-owned enterprises of EU countries varies widely, 
however available information on their performance is fragile. Nevertheless, 
significant even if minute steps forward are being made in Italy, in fact, the 
publication of the database on SOEs (especially key accounts variables) has 
constituted a considerable advance over the previous situation, allowing the 
knowledge of the main characteristics of such firms, and facilitating the evaluation 
of performance according to the different industries. With this in mind, it is 
underlined that the performance can be strongly affected by a multitude of 
exogenous factors that can’t be observed from our analyses. At any rate, Putnam 
et al. (1994) provide measures to evaluate institutional performance given that the 
quality of the institution is strongly correlated with growth (Arnold et al. 2011).  
Prior research provides useful inputs using different approaches and shows that 
new challenges arise for public organisations as they have to deal with rapid and 
accelerating economic change, increasing complexity of regulatory issues, new 
technologies and services, calls for openness, transparency and citizen 
participation (Pitlik et al. 2012). Reforms must be implemented and sustained 
during times when fiscal constraints and budget consolidation pressures become 
increasingly tighter since good legislative frameworks can promote the healthy 
functioning of the market (Arnold et al. 2011).  
However, regulatory frameworks (i) may be flawed by various factors that 
undermine their public interest aims, (ii) may involve costs that exceed their 
expected benefits; (iii) may suddenly become obsolete because of technical 
developments or the evolution of demand. Many economists tend to be inclined to 
foster policies aimed at increasing competition in order to increase efficiency 
(Amaral et al., 2009; Jonsson, 1984; Niskanen, 1973).  
Such competition can also be generated with the aid of continuous productivity and 
efficiency comparisons between public bodies which provide similar output. 
Likewise, other authors have been stressing the importance of collaboration 
(Entwistle and Martin, 2005; Hartley et al. 2013; Osborne and Strokosch, 2013; 
Warner, 2011). 
In this paper the ownership of enterprises is also discussed, there is in fact 
renewed interest in the role that SOEs can play in promoting economic 
development, the relationship between SOEs and the government as a 
shareholder, and the criteria used in assessing options for investing in or disposing 
of state-owned enterprises. Given the importance of a well-functioning sector and 
the presence of certain indications that competition in the Italian local public 
transport struggles (Boitani et al. 2009; IBL, 2013), we try to look at the reasons for 
these inefficiencies.  
Arrigo and Di Foggia ● The scope of public organisations with productive functions 
136 
In an effort to provide these concepts with more details, we focus on the 
performance of the selected enterprises operating in it. As the industry is strongly 
regulated and the behaviour of companies needs to be assessed in the context of 
the existing regulatory framework, we also look in broad terms at aspects of the 
regulatory framework. We then champion some conditions to be achieved or 
defended, such requirements lies in the restriction of the spoil system, choice of 
management made from specific lists of candidates with a certified level of 
expertise and based on free-access comparative selection procedures and 
implementation of training schools and human resources development.  
Appropriate policies could provide citizens with efficient services while at the same 
time may contribute to the creation of an open business environment that supports 
the competitiveness of the industry. That said, policies will ensure that services 
entrusted by open, transparent and non-discriminatory tenders, make available the 
public service obligations and the procedures for determining compensation, and 
define precisely the subject of the tender and the amount of investments.  
The results of our analysis suggest a positive relation between open business 
environment and productivity. Nevertheless this relation is only tested using the 
return on equity (ROE) as dependent variable consistently with the Italian Ministry 
of Economics. We find that SOEs operating in a highly liberalised market (energy) 
outperform those operating in local public transportation. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: in the first section, we provide 
a review of related literature used to introduce and support our statements. After 
that, the background of the Italian situation is presented; this is followed by the 
introduction of the Italian local public transport market. Next, the empirical analysis 
is performed. The discussion of the results and conclusion follow. 
2. Review of relevant literature 
The evolution of the role of government in modern states has been well 
documented and arguably represents one of the current most thought-provoking 
topics (Heady, 2001). A keystone in the classification of roles is the work of 
Musgrave (1959); providing for adjustments in the distribution of income and the 
function of contributing to stabilisation, see Habermas (1994), Dahl (1947) and 
Kettl (2002). Similarly, Bator (1958), Newman (1974), Brown, Potoski and Van 
Slyke (2006), Haque, (2001) describe the triple role of government: security of the 
individuals’ freedom, the redistribution of resources, and the intervention in market 
failures. While the first two roles – redistribution of resources and the intervention in 
market failures – derive from the functioning of the market, as explained in 
normative economic theory (Buchanan, 1968; Martimort and Pouyet, 2008), the 
security of the individuals’ freedom is a condition sine qua non of modern states 
(Brennan, 1977; Nozick, 1974). It might be objected thought that despite many 
different approaches have been proposed in an effort to shed some light on this 
issue the identification of scope and functions is tough (Hood, 2000). This is 
corroborated by Raadschelders and Lee (2011) that present a historical review of 
research and infer that more recent research has tended to focus on different 
methods, mainly regarding organisation, metrics and performance (Frederickson et 
al 2003; Grandy, 2009; Ostrom and Ostrom, 1971).  
A critical aspect however of many studies aimed at assessing the performance of 
public entities in complying with their mandate is the comparability of methodology 
and results characterised by remarkable heterogeneity. In this sense, Afonso et al. 
(2005) compute public sector performance (PSP) and public sector efficiency 
(PSE) indicators and find differences that lead the authors to suggest paths to 
public savings. To the same token Dabla-Norris et al. (2012) provide a public 
investment efficiency index that captures the institutional environment underpinning 
public investment management across four different stages: project appraisal, 
selection, implementation, and evaluation. These studies suggest that 
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governments besides the public sector play an important role in the economic life 
of the state through the revenue and expenditure measures.  In the same fashion 
of the general roles outlines above the essential economic purposes orbit around 
are taxation and expenditure measures, stabilisation policies (required by the 
government to affect the levels of aggregate demand) and allocation, i.e. the 
provision of public goods that cannot be provided through market mechanism. In 
certain cases, e.g. if there is market failure, government may be able to provide the 
good at a more optimal level and price if compared with the market equilibrium. As 
a matter of fact the economic mandate justifies a productive function, eventually, in 
the form of public producers, both providing market and non-market goods and 
services.  
Nonetheless, other models of provision of market and non-market goods and 
services exist, e.g. public-private partnerships are growing in popularity as a 
governing model (Forrer et al., 2010). As a producer of goods and services, public 
administration plays a significant role for the well-being of citizens and the 
competitiveness of countries.  
Hence, the questions of which factors improve performance and raise capacities of 
a public administration to provide goods and services efficiently are at the heart of 
all discussions about public sector reforms (Pitlik et al., 2012). To this regard a 
great deal has been written about the politics-related factors that impact on 
performance of firms (Al-Obaidan and Scully, 1992; Bottasso and Sembenelli, 
2004; Sapienza, 2004; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Zheng et al. 2003). Amaral 
(2008) analyses the determinants of the performance differential between the 
private and public management of urban public transport in Europe. According to 
the author, private management is associated with lower operating costs; however, 
the differential can depend on the interaction of the local authorities' capacity for 
expertise and the private operators' autonomy margin. In terms of total costs, no 
systematic advantages should be expected from private management. Despite 
significant regional variation both between and within different regions, there is 
widespread consensus on the scope of SOEs, for example, to correct market 
failures, provide public goods, and foster economic development (Kowalski, Büge, 
Sztajerowska and Egeland 2013). The previously mentioned productive functions 
justify certain public producers (Arrigo and Di Foggia, 2013; Dewenter and 
Malatesta, 2001; Toninelli, 2000).  
Although the government as a regulator and owner of assets opens a possibility of 
favourable treatment granted to SOEs (Kowalski, Büge, Sztajerowska and 
Egeland, 2013), it may be argued that there is, however, still little reliable 
information on their efficiency and on the advantages they may be enjoying 
because of their ownership since SOEs increasingly compete with private firms.  
Firms frequently interact with public administration in many different ways and in a 
variety of different circumstances. In addition, firms indirectly rely on public 
administration outputs. Thus, an efficient public administration that efficiently 
provides public goods and services and that absorbs relatively few public 
resources affects productivity and competitiveness of firms (Afonso et al. 2005; 
Allum, 1974; Calandra, 1978; Fratianni and Spinelli,1982; Ongaro, 2004; Torres, 
2004). Other authors provide pieces of evidence on the causes of inefficiency 
(Capano, 2003; Cassese, 1993; Del Monte and Papagni, 2001; Tanzi, 1998). 
Bandiera et al. (2008) estimate the cost of active (its presence entails direct or 
indirect benefit for the public decision-maker) and passive (its presence does not 
advantage the public decision-maker) waste from observed costs of public 
services.  
The authors assess the impact on how efficiently a certain public service is 
provided. Their model focused on generic goods purchase which account for 40 
per cent of public spending for goods and services. Their findings suggest that the 
difference in prices across public bodies is principally due to variation in passive 
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(83 per cent of total) rather than active waste.  Based on average total cost (Frank, 
Bernanke and Johnston, 2007) show that productive inefficiency implies an excess 
of production costs. Other noteworthy and widely investigate elements that concur 
to determine the average low performance of Italy are both clientelism (Caciagli, 
2006; Della Porta and Vannucci, 1997; García, 2013; Guzzini, 1995) and 
corruption. Also results of a recent study (Fiorino et al. 2012) confirm evidence of a 
negative correlation between corruption and growth.  
At the time of writing a controversial topic is the underperformance of local public 
transport or LPT sector. It is generally acknowledged that public budgets, including 
those dedicated to cover public transport, are under significant constraints. Recent 
austerity measures have affected this sector too. Between 2010 and 2012, the 
industry witnessed an overall decline in resources (600 million) or -12 per cent of 
public contributions. The reduction of public transfers has triggered a general 
tendency to raise the price of tickets. According to a recent fact-finding 
investigation of the Italian Competition Authority (AGCOM, 2014), the ongoing 
situation of general inefficiency and lack of financial resources is largely attributable 
to the ownership, the management objectives and the regulatory framework that is 
layered and not always consistent. As highlighted by Asquer (2011), local public 
transport has traditionally been operated by local state-owned enterprises – SOEs. 
Boitani et al. (2009) investigate how the ownership and the procedure for the 
selection of firms operating in the local public transport sector affect their 
productivity. In order to compare different institutional regimes, they carry out a 
comparative analysis of companies operating in large European cities. The authors 
find that when firms are totally or partially in public hands their productivity is lower.  
Moreover, firms selected through competitive tendering display higher total factor 
productivity. However there are cases of SOEs success worldwide and some 
SOEs are closing the gap with their private-sector competitors. 
As far as we know, there are, however, few studies that specifically analyse SOEs 
based on profitability measures. Bovaird and Löffler (2009) provide some highlights 
on key concepts of management and performance measurement that include 
profitability ratios. In fact the profit made by organizations can be effectively 
evaluated when compared to the amount of resources and activity required to 
generate it. Return on investment (ROI) is a widely used measure of overall 
performance and there are two key approaches to ROI (Walsh, 2003). The first 
approach is based on the Return on Total Assets (ROTA) or Return on Capital 
Employed (ROCE) which focuses on operating efficiency of the total enterprise.  
The second approach, employed in this paper, is based on the Return on Equity 
(ROE), which concentrates on performance efficiency as translated into return to 
shareholders. It is anticipated that this approach opens to several interpretations. 
3. Background 
3.1. Unsuitability of regulation prevents the healthy functioning 
of local markets 
A breakthrough in regulatory policy during the last decades has been the 
awareness that government objectives for the utility industries can also take benefit 
from facilitating competition (Arrigo and Di Foggia, 2013). The European 
Commission enforces competition rules towards a single market by ensuring that 
all companies compete equally and fairly (European Commission, 2014a). This 
benefits consumers, businesses and the economy as a whole.  
The competitive market is primarily a selection mechanism of economic behaviour, 
evaluated in terms of efficiency, able to protect consumers and ultimately the 
general public from the effects of poor decisions made by producers.  
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Still, if competition does not seem possible with regards to public organisations that 
produce administrative acts, it may be introduced for SOEs that compete with 
private companies under specific rules and in viable sectors. This can introduce 
adequate competition for services that will be offered by many organizations using 
the same infrastructure, as it is not economically convenient to duplicate it (OECD, 
2004). To this extent, Arnold et al. (2011) underscore that regulation generally 
addresses public-interest concerns about market failures, including monopoly 
conditions, externalities and asymmetric information. In this context, a good 
regulation can promote competition in certain industries by ensuring that market 
power in natural-monopoly segments is not used abusively and by providing the 
correct incentives to business participants.  
However, regulatory frameworks may be flawed by various factors, thus (i) some 
regulations may drift away from their original public interest aims, (ii) regulations 
sometimes involve costs that exceed their expected benefits and (iii) technical 
development, the evolution of demand and progress in regulatory techniques can 
make the design of regulations obsolete.  
Even if it does not create effective competition, the separation of production and 
distribution would make the introduction of forms of comparative competition 
between suppliers operating in different geographical areas possible. The same 
method may also be introduced in order to evaluate the performance of similar 
offices in the typically public area of the production of administrative acts.  
3.2. Degree of liberalisation 
The World Economic Forum defines competitiveness as the set of institutions, 
policies, and factors that determine the level of productivity of a country. At the 
roots of competitiveness are the institutional and microeconomic policy 
arrangements that create the right conditions for a wealthy business environment 
under which businesses can grow (European Commission, 2014b). By analysing 
eight sectors, Asquer (2011) suggests that the difficulty to implement liberalisation 
and regulatory reforms in Italy may be explained by various concurrent forces, 
which have to do with: the rent-seeking behaviour, the rise of barriers to entry 
against competitors, and the risk of collusive practices between regulators and 
regulated. It becomes therefore important to shed some light on factors that impact 
the efficiency of Italian public administration.Table 1 gives an idea about the rank of 
liberalisation in different sectors in Italy. For each sector a number of criteria are 
employed in order to assess the existence of barriers to entry in, organization 
within, and exit from the market. The existence of such barriers is inferred from a 
number of quantitative as well as qualitative indicators. Among the former, 
concentration indices, price dynamics, the public vs. private ownership of the 
incumbents, and other structural indicators are considered. Among the latter, the 
Index of Liberalisation looks at such indicators as the degree of unbundling for 
essential facilities in network industries, the existence of fiscal or legal 
discriminations against the newcomers, the regulatory quality, etc.   
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Table 1: Index of Liberalisation (Italy) 
Sectors 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2012/07* 
Natural Gas 48 54 52 55 62 64 +16 
Post 37 38 38 41 47 52 +15 
Electricity 63 65 69 71 72 77 +14 
Labour Market 50 35 55 60 60 60 +10 
Motorway 32 32 29 29 28 40 +8 
Financial Services 59 62 63 64 69 66 +7 
Professional 
orders 46 46 47 47 47 52 +6 
Italy (total) 47 47 49 48 49 52 +5 
Telecommunicatio
n 40 35 39 41 42 45 +5 
Art 55 55 56 56 56 58 +3 
Inland revenue 44 43 52 48 48 47 +3 
Public 
administration 40 37 35 38 39 42 +2 
Local public 
transport 45 46 43 43 44 45 0 
Airways 66 70 68 60 62 65 -1 
Water 27 27 32 17 19 19 -8 
TV 70 68 67 65 62 61 -9 
Railways 49 49 49 41 36 36 -13 
*Change over the period 2007 – 2012. Source: IBL (2012), Liberalisation Index, page 41. 
Table 1 also shows the overall rankings of the IBL liberalisation index, comparing 
this year’s rankings with those from the previous edition of the index, showing all 
sectors ranked together. As Graph 1 shows the IBL Index of Liberalisation appears 
to be correlated with the World Economic Forum’s Competitiveness Index while it is 
negatively correlated with the OECD State Control indicator (The indicator covers 
formal regulations in the area of state control of business enterprises). These 
relationships support the idea that the selected index captures factors that are 
important for developing the LPT industry. On the same basis we see the IBL 
Liberalisation Index is taken as a reference for measuring the liberalisation degree 
of two Italian sectors, namely LPT and energy to be used in our analysis. 
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Graph 1: Correlation between IBL's Index of Liberalisations, WEF's 
Competitiveness index and OECD State Control Indicator 
 
Source: own elaboration based on IBL liberalisation index (IBL_Lib), OECS State Control indicator 
(OECD_STC), WEF competitiveness index (WEF; GCI). Reference year: 2013. 
3.3. The ownership of organisations 
There are well-known differences between governance of public and private 
companies (Rainey et al. 1976) and the concept of governance is a growing body 
of European literature (Peters and Pierre, 1998).  Although state-owned enterprises 
as government assets open a possibility of favourable treatment these 
organisations may cope with multiple, unclear, or conflicting financial and social 
objectives. Political interference can prompt decisions that threaten a company’s 
financial goals; therefore, managers can find it thorny to match the private sector’s 
performance standards. The defining characteristics of such organisations are that 
they have a distinct legal form and they are established to operate in markets even 
in they may also have public policy objectives. 
To better comprehend the struggle of public management and decision-taking 
process one must remember that administrative action within the sphere of the 
state that produces administrative acts, is governed by rigid written procedures that 
are consistent with the justice/equality objectives that administrative action 
pursues. Garrone et al. (2013), underline that management discretion is a 
significant source of inefficiency in municipal enterprises. Public sector 
organisations are similar to private companies since they have hierarchical 
structures that impose mandatory allocations of productive factors.  
However, while in private companies personal authority as defined by Arrow (1974) 
is dominant,  in public organisations impersonal authority prevails, consisting of 
written rules and laws and regulations that are relatively rigid and stable over time 
(Arrow, 1974). In this way, public sector organisations do not benefit from the 
advantage that private companies have, represented by non-rigidity and the open 
and only partially predetermined content of work contracts. In private companies, 
the rules and procedures are subject to the leadership, on the contrary, in public 
organisations, leadership is subject to rules. Therefore, in the case of poor legal 
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systems, when producing services for citizens, managers slog to achieve 
dynamically efficient solutions. Dwyer and Edwards (2009) digest this concept: 
dealing with change in the external environment creates considerable challenges 
for managers. Given the complexity of strategy formulation it is difficult for 
managers to analyse all aspects of their environment or establish precise 
objectives, consequently business strategies tend to be characterised by small 
strategic adjustments or “incrementalism”.  
However, these marginal adjustments of strategy within an organisation’s existing 
culture may lead to strategic drift reflecting strategies that are inconsistent with 
changes taking place in the external environment. Besides, Andrews et al. (2006) 
show that the organisational failure is to some extent attributable to difficult 
circumstances and management features such as weak leadership and poor 
performance management.  
Ongaro and Valotti (2008) identify some factors affecting implementation of public 
management reform: characteristics of the administrative tradition and features of 
the politico-administrative context; the design of the reform package and the 
coalition of interests sustaining the reform; behavioural triggers; and the building 
over the time of management capacity at the level of individual public sector 
organisations. 
According to the financial police, in 2013, fraud and waste amounted to €5 billion 
and (over 19,000 managers identified by the military). Specifically, the complaints 
to the judicial authorities, concerning crimes against the public administration, were 
more than 4,300 among others: bribery, extortion, embezzlement, misappropriation 
of funds, and abuse of office. The offences were put in place by directors, officers 
and civil servants alike. Additionally, it is worth noting that, results of 25,000 
inspections performed in 2013 show that among 1,704 public employees (total 
public employees amounted to 3.3 million) were sued for incompatibility with other 
assignments or jobs (GdF, 2013). 
State-owned enterprises may be overmanned to please employees that are voters 
too (Boycko et al. 1996). Non-commercial purposes can also make a firm 
vulnerable in the wage-bargaining process (Haskel and Szymanski, 1992). Willner 
(2001) presents conditions under which political interference yields higher welfare 
than under commercial purposes, and vice versa. This supports a further efficiency 
gap of public organisations linked to the control of the organisation by politicians, 
resulting in resources for institutional duties instead being used by the political 
class, above all to bestow private benefits to constituencies (Boubakri et al. 2008).  
The data presented in Table 2 relate to 6,151 companies out of a total of 7,065 
participated. In particular, for about 700 companies no data were available and so 
they were excluded. Nevertheless, according to Spicer (2010), scholars have too 
often been condescending towards the linkages between politics and governance, 
viewing political activities and interests as opportunities for corruption, 
mismanagement, and skewed priorities.  
Table 2: participated companies (by local administrations) 
Performance Number of 
companies 
Percentage Operative result 
(billion €) 
Average share 
(participation) 
Profit 2879 47% 1.413 29% 
Neutral* 1249 20%  60% 
Loss  2023 33% -2.214 15% 
Total 6151 100% -0.801  
* Companies with a loss or a gain up to 0.5% of net income are neutral:  
-0.5% < Net income/Asset < 0.5%. Source: MEF (2013) 
3.4. The LPT industry 
At the time of writing a controversial issue is the apparent underperformance of 
local public transport sector. According to a recent fact-finding investigation of the 
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Italian Competition Authority (AGCOM, 2014), the ongoing situation of general 
inefficiency and lack of financial resources is largely attributable to the ownership 
and the management objectives. The report highlights several critical issues, 
among others: the organisation and procedures to select service operators (in 
many cases, the transport services are entrusted to state-owned inefficient 
companies or are managed on the basis of repeated extensions); the lack of 
transparency, efficiency and regulation of contracts, the overlap of activities of 
entrusted operators: monopoly and competition and problems that arise with 
respect to the determination of compensation, often awarded on the basis of 
criteria not aimed at efficient costs. The inefficiency of SOEs can generate losses 
other than the operating ones (€1.2 billion in 2012 according to the Italian 
Competition Authority). Even if almost all industries in which SOEs operate 
underperform, remarkable losses refer to the LPT (€300 million in 2012), other non-
operating losses  are funded indeed by service contracts and government transfers 
(to current or capital account), or by citizens through tariffs based on the service 
total cost, e.g. the waste management sector. 
As highlighted by Asquer (2011), local public transport has traditionally been 
operated by local SOEs. In addition, the regulatory framework is layered and not 
always consistent. As per the market structure one may note that the LPT sector is 
highly regulated, and differently from other European countries, on the supply side, 
there are plenty of SMEs. A European comparison shows that in Italy the market 
share of the top three operators is equal to 26 per cent compared to 56 per cent in 
the UK, 77 per cent in France and 40 per cent in Sweden, and that 88 per cent of 
enterprises have fewer than 100 employees. Other data are shown in Table 3. 
Amaral (2008) analyses the determinants of the performance differential between 
the private and public managements of urban public transport in Europe. According 
to the author, private management is associated with lower operating costs; 
however, the differential can depend on the interaction of the local authorities’ 
capacity for expertise and the private operators’ autonomy margin. In terms of total 
costs, no systematic advantages should be expected from private management. 
Boitani et al. (2009) investigate how the ownership and the procedure for the 
selection of firms operating in the local public transport sector affect their 
productivity. In order to compare different institutional regimes, they carry out a 
comparative analysis of companies operating in large European cities. The authors 
find that when firms are totally or partially in public hands their productivity is lower. 
Moreover, firms selected through competitive tendering display higher total factor 
productivity. However, there are cases of SOE success worldwide and some SOEs 
are closing the gap with their private-sector competitors. 
Table 3: key data of the LPT Industry 
TPL industry Values (≈) Unit of measure 
Companies 1150 Number 
Employees 116500 Number 
Turnover 10 Billion € 
Kilometres year (billion) 5.4 Billion Km 
Fleet (N°) 50000 Number 
      Buses 92 Share (%) 
      Other means 8 Share (%) 
Source: own elaboration 
It is worth noting that 82 per cent of the production value comes from SOEs, which 
run 95 per cent of the urban transport services and 75 per cent of suburban public 
transport services. In 2013, most of the companies generated losses, with worse 
outcomes compared to those of other European countries (UK, Germany, France, 
Sweden, the Netherlands and Belgium). In the segment of road transport, the 
average EBIT (-1.1 per cent) is poorer than the European average (3.5 per cent). 
The comparison with other countries is also negative considering the revenue per 
km of traffic (€1.08 against a European average of €1.34) and the public 
contributions €2.2/Km against a €1.4/Km European average of (AGCOM, 2014). 
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Table 1 shows that while the Italian situation increased from 2007 to 2012, local 
public transport did not. It is important to emphasise the referendum held in 2011 
that has affected the existing rules of local public services and in particular on local 
public transport (DPR, 2011). The mentioned referendum has limited the floor for 
fair competition in the field of local public transport. Furthermore, the structure of 
the Italian LPT industry is characterised by fragmentation as several firms operate 
in relatively small user basin areas. Asquer (2011) advises that, considering the 
Italian environment, LPT has been traditionally run by local state-owned 
enterprises.  
Graph 2: IBL Liberalisation Index – focus on Energy and LPT 
 
Source: own elaboration on IBL (2012). Energy = Electricity + Gas 
4. Empirical analysis 
Our primary source of data is the database of companies wholly or partially owned 
by the government (at different levels) published in 2014 by the Ministry of 
Economy and Finance (MEF). This choice was aimed at getting a general picture 
of the performance of the firms listed in the database. For our analysis, we 
managed to retrieve additional financial information and contextual variables from 
reliable sources: ISTAT as per contextual variables and Amadeus, a database of 
comparable financial information for public and private companies. We decided to 
omit variables related to industrial output and to take into consideration industrial 
activities and location to group the information. The statistical technique employed 
was OLS regression. One of the principal challenges inherent in this approach – 
besides the assumption that the data are independent –  was the lack of a 
definitive and universally accepted variable to be used as an object for the 
evaluation or dependent variable; thus we decided to employ the same index of the 
MEF report; the return on equity - ROE. Serious precautions were taken accurately 
and thoroughly to screen, clean and model the data in an effort to enhance results: 
1,554 firms out of 3,500 used. The main limitation of the variables omission is the 
amount of variance accounted for in the response variable by the predictors. R-
squared in fact indicates that the model accounts for a very low variance. However, 
provided the purpose of this paper, major benefits of models predominate. Our 
work clearly has some limitations: sample, methodology, and absence of a time 
element to foster causal relations. 
4.1. Variables 
The key variable for the performance appraisal of the firms is ROE, which is the 
most valuable indicator. It includes both dividends paid to shareholders and the 
retained profit which technically belongs to shareholders and which generates 
future capital growth (Pizam, 2010). Since the ROE is useful for comparing the 
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profitability of a company to that of other firms in the same industry, we add some 
dummy variables to define both industrial activities and geographical distributions. 
As follows, the used variables accompanied the meaning. 
 ROE: return on equity (retrieved for 2011, 2012 and 2013) 
 EP: (operating revenue/cost of employees)*100 
 EMPL: log of employees 2012 
 PRCO12: log of Total production cost 
 PRVA12: log of total production value 
 DERD: debt equity ratio 2012 – debt equity ratio 2011 
 AV12: added value per capita 
 CL12: cost per employee 
 GDP12: gross domestic product at NUTS3 level (Italian provinces) 
 POP: population of the municipality  
 ALT: log of altitude (metres) 
 NET: dummy variable, it takes a value of 1 for companies that operate in a 
typical network public service (energy, gas, water, LPT, waste) 0 
otherwise. 
 ENERGY: dummy variable, it takes a value of 1 for companies that operate 
in the energy sector “energy” , 0 otherwise 
 TPL: dummy variable, it takes a value of 1 for companies that operate in 
the LPT sector, 0 otherwise. 
 NCS: 1= North, 2=Centre, 3=South and Islands (Sicily and Sardinia). 
4.2. Evidence 
Table 4 presents correlations (2012 and 2013) for return of equity and financial 
output per employee, PE. Weak even if interesting features emerge from a reading 
of this table. Profitability of the analysed companies slightly decreases in southern 
regions, Sicily and Sardinia.   
Table 4: Correlation of some variable with geography 
 Variables ROE13 ROE12 EP13 EP12 NCS 
ROE13 1 
ROE12 0.44 1 
EP13 0.13 0.10 1 
EP12 0.12 0.14 0.88 1 
NCS -0.02 -0.06 -0.08 -0.06 1 
Source: own elaboration.  
Similarly, correlations for independent variables used in the models are shown in 
Table 5. Unsurprisingly PRCO12 and PRVA12 are highly correlated, however this 
feature does not undermine the effectiveness. All other variables are pretty much 
uncorrelated. 
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  Table 5: Correlation of dependent variables 
EMPL 
PRCO1
2 PRVA12 DERD AV12 CL12 GDP12 POP ALT 
EMPL 1 
PRCO12 0.86 1 
PRVA12 0.85 1.00 1 
DERD -0.07 -0.02 -0.02 1 
AV12 0.03 0.37 0.40 -0.02 1 
CL12 0.25 0.43 0.43 -0.01 0.54 1 
GDP12 -0.04 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.13 0.03 1 
POP 0.26 0.27 0.27 -0.01 0.08 0.18 0.00 1 
ALT -0.15 -0.15 -0.16 -0.01 -0.05 -0.10 0.12 -0.46 1 
Source: own elaboration 
Our first estimation results are shown in Table 6, which presents several alternative 
specifications of our reference model in column (1) that represents the starting 
point. In model (2) the variable NET identifies the network public services, within 
model (3) the energy & gas sector is defined by the variable ENERGY, while the 
model (4) is aimed at characterise the LPT sector. The model in column (1) 
provides broad preliminary support for our further assumptions regarding the 
determinants of ROE. First, with respect to production cost PRCO12 and value 
PRCO12, we find that coefficients are as expected negative in the case of 
PRCO12 and positive considering PROVA12, both at the 1 per cent significance 
level. In line with what anticipated we find a negative coefficient associated with the 
number of employees EMPL, also (p<0.001). Moreover, the gross domestic 
product per capita has a positive impact on the return of equity (p<0.001). A 
morphological characteristic, the altitude ALT, though (p<0.1) negatively influences 
the performance too. It must be stressed that factors that do not show up as 
significant are by no means unimportant. 
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Table 6: Model outputs 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES ROE ROE ROE ROE 
     
EMPL -2.876*** -2.933*** -2.537*** -2.558*** 
 (0.788) (0.789) (0.800) (0.795) 
PRCO12 -54.01*** -54.11*** -54.29*** -53.23*** 
 (4.460) (4.462) (4.457) (4.461) 
PRVA12 57.06*** 57.06*** 56.92*** 56.11*** 
 (4.746) (4.747) (4.741) (4.750) 
DERD -0.00244*** -0.00245*** -0.00250*** -0.00241*** 
 (0.000709) (0.000709) (0.000708) (0.000708) 
AV -1.940    
 (1.308)    
CL12 0.136    
 (1.304)    
GDP12 6.351*** 6.578*** 6.425*** 6.103*** 
 (2.202) (2.212) (2.202) (2.202) 
POP -0.113    
 (0.338)    
ALT -0.659* -0.687** -0.718** -0.613* 
 (0.340) (0.340) (0.340) (0.339) 
NET  1.421   
  (1.223)   
ENERGY   4.794**  
   (2.056)  
TPL    -6.390*** 
    (2.328) 
Constant -68.84*** -70.55*** -67.41*** -66.18*** 
 (22.51) (22.57) (22.51) (22.51) 
     
Observations 1,554 1,553 1,553 1,553 
R-squared 0.152 0.153 0.155 0.156 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
Non-significant variables other than dummies are only kept in column (1) 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The results in model alternatives in Table 6 are generally consistent with those in 
the model (1) and in particular reinforce our arguments. All of the variables that 
were significant in column (1) remain significant.  Overall, the results of the three 
regression analyses, columns (1), (2) and (3) with ROE  as dependent variable 
reveal a number of insights into what how the industrial activity (NET stands for 
network public service, LPT because of its low liberalisation rank and ENERGY 
since one of the most liberalised sectors) contribute to the measure of 
performance. Considering the model in column (2) one may note the coefficient is 
positive though not significant. Indeed, coefficients associated with the dummy 
variables ENERGY, positive (p<0.05), and LPT, negative (p<0.01) are both 
significant.  
5. Discussion and conclusion 
Examining our results, we speculate that while not all of the results were 
significant, the overall direction of results showed trends that could be helpful to 
learning about profitability of local public transport. Indices that measure the 
efficiency of the participated companies can be an important stimulus to their 
performance improvement. The database published by the Ministry of Economics 
and Finance reports a well-known index of efficiency, namely the return on equity - 
ROE. Return on Equity measures a corporation's profitability by revealing how 
much profit a company generates with the money shareholders have invested. 
Noticeably profitability measures alone fail to capture in full the performance of 
SOEs because of the scope that these organisations pursue. In addition, although 
state-owned enterprises as government assets open a possibility of favourable 
treatment, managers of these organisations may cope with multiple, unclear, or 
conflicting financial and social objectives, therefore, they can find it thorny to match 
the private sector’s performance standards. As anticipated in the literature section 
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there are contrasting studies focused on the eventual political interference and on 
its effective ability to prompt decisions that threaten a company’s financial goals.  
Our findings share a number of similarities with those reported in some of the 
papers above mentioned and in terms of the models presented in Table 6, results 
support the theoretical assumption that different levels of liberalisation associated 
with different industrial activities affect the ROE. Apparently, a competitive 
environment with a sound regulatory framework may enable improvements in the 
profitability of firms, specifically the performance efficiency as translated into return 
to shareholders. In addition coefficients associated with the dummy variables 
ENERGY, positive (p<0.05), and LPT, negative (p<0.01) are both significant, 
therefore as put forward, our results show different profitability of firms across 
different markets, regulatory frameworks and competition levels. Given that our 
findings are based on a limited number of firms, the results from such analyses 
should consequently be treated with the utmost caution. Important limitations might 
have influenced the results obtained, allowing alternative explanations. In 
particular, as previously indicated, it is possible that inefficiency may be driven 
more by omitted forces than by the variables highlighted in our theoretical and 
empirical arguments.  
As per the regulation of local public services, the current situation is at a standstill. 
Although the goal is to move from a system of attribution of exclusive rights by 
issuing administrative orders to the liberalisation of the service, which entails the 
consequent free delivery, some critical aspects must be considered, among others 
the public service obligations to be observed by the operating entity, the definition 
of economic compensation and the issue of minimum standards (efficiency and 
quality) of services to be provided. We underline the need for high quality services 
granted in efficient and affordable procedures and providing all stakeholders with 
the required legal certainty. In this sense appropriate policies would provide people 
with efficient services while at the same time contribute to the creation of an open 
business environment that supports the competitiveness of the industry. As a 
premise, the simplification of the market access procedure, in terms of time 
required for authorisation is needed. At the same time the widely recognised lack of 
transparency in the current system impedes the efficient development of this 
market. We claim that the completion of the liberalisation and simultaneously the 
privatisation of a number of enterprises would pilot a better allocation of resources 
and consequently to an increase of the demand (apparently under the level of the 
mentioned European countries). As a matter of fact, according to OECD (2006), 
SOEs face explicit difficulties regarding their governance since are often effectively 
protected from two major threats i.e. threat of takeover and bankruptcy.  Data in 
Table 7  seem to confirm that problems arise when control of public entities exceed 
the 50 per cent. We also agree with findings of the Competition authority AGCOM 
(2014) who advises that the most important aspects for the market development 
are the proper definition of the areas of public service, both in terms of territory as 
regards the nature of the services offered and the definition of minimum services 
and the related question of the correct quantification of the compensation of the 
public service obligations.  
Table 7: Net Income per employee and EBITDA margin (Italy - EU 15) 
country Public ownership EBITDA 
Net Income per  
Employee 
IT >50.01% 8.05 -2.69 ≤ 50% 10.11 43.80 
EU-15 >50.01% 11.18 18.39 ≤ 50% 13.24 74.39 
Source: own elaboration 
Our results contribute to the literature on the governance of Italian public transport 
by focusing on how different market structures influence the profitability of firms. 
Results support leaders of public sector organisations as well as policy makers. 
European Journal of Government and Economics 4(2)  
 
149 
Our research suggests that, as per the profitability of firms within the LPT sector, 
SOEs could boost their productivity. However, companies and other organisations 
and policy makers need to address considerable challenges if they are to capture 
the full potential of such markets. 
5.1. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have highlighted that public organisations with productive 
responsibilities – public producers – may face multiple problems linked to the 
ownership, the management, the regulatory framework and the degree of 
competition of the markets in which they operate. This is done in conformity with 
the findings of the European Commission (2014b) report on competition as it  
shows that competition enforcement helps promoting growth and competitiveness 
of states, prevents dominant companies from expelling competitors from the 
market, keeps markets open and efficient, and creates the conditions for lower 
input prices for the industry. As per the government expenditure related to SOEs 
(also in the form of state aid), policies aimed at enforcing competition help to steer 
public resources towards growth-enhancing objectives. Indeed, on the one hand 
we have stressed that like unlawful government subsidies, unproductive 
government expenditure in SOEs can distort the level playing field, erect 
superfluous barriers and undermine the growth potential. On the other hand, we 
have also pointed out that government support and intervention can also have a 
positive impact when it is well-targeted. 
We advocate that efficiency and profitability problems arise in markets 
characterised by biases in some of the above mentioned aspects which threaten 
competition. This is particularly true in those markets where governments tend to 
intervene to protect incumbents.  Focusing on local public transport, we have 
highlighted critical aspects that have a negative impact on market development. 
Specifically, the evidence of this study and the related literature points towards the 
idea that both exogenous factors like the regulatory framework and the level of 
competition coexist with endogenous factors (ownership and size) and mutually 
concur to the inefficiency of LPT. Given these points, we have underlined that the 
results of our estimates reinforce our arguments. Our results endow preliminary 
support for our assumptions. Overall, the results of the three regression analyses 
reveal a number of signals on how the market structure impacts on the employed 
measure of performance, the ROE. Indeed, coefficients associated with the 
variables aimed at identifying the energy and LPT markets, confirm the better 
performance of firms operating in the energy market. The findings are not 
representative of the entire SOEs universe firstly because of the lack of consistent 
and robust information and secondly because in line with the opening decision this 
paper does not address in detail the potential additional affecting forces. The 
results however will be trusted considering the uniformity with most of the 
dedicated literature, though the findings cannot be generalised to other markets, 
countries or even measures of performance.  
Our research suggests that policies aimed at containing government expenditure 
and in the meantime increasing the efficiency of the services provided will (i) 
ensure that service operators are entrusted by open, transparent and non-
discriminatory tenders and procedures, (ii) put at the   disposal of all potential 
operators clear and sound rules to comply with the public service obligations and 
simplify procedures for determining compensation, and (iii) define precisely the 
subject of the tenders in order not to hamper considerably the participation of new 
entrants.  
The findings of this research have managerial implications too. Governments 
should be able to select top-level management on SOEs who shall then have 
autonomy. After that, the selection of personnel (both at top and middle levels) 
should only be made from specific lists detailing candidates with certified expertise 
based on free-access comparative selection procedures. To do this, advanced and 
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professional schools for public management should be enforced, creating incentive 
schemes to encourage young people who are motivated and prepared for a public 
career. Future work will concentrate on an international comparison of controlled 
companies and SOEs’ governance, regulation and performance in specific sectors 
by share of ownership. 
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